Tyler Cowan over at Marginal Revolution approvingly (I assume) reposts the following:
The wise man expunges "positive v. normative" from his vocabulary. Ises and oughts are easily and naturally translated into one another, based on the purposes of the interlocutors and the discourse situation.
The words "positive" and "normative" do not mean nothing, but what they mean can always be expressed in better terms. "Normative" often means outspoken, unconventional, strident, etc. It can also mean loose, vague, and indeterminate.
Tell me "positive" or "normative" for each of the following:(1) The minimum wage ought to be repealed.
(2) I think the minimum wage ought to be repealed.
(3) The minimum wage reduces social welfare.
(4) Wise people oppose the minimum wage.
The primary verb of (1) is an ought, while the primary verbs of (2), (3), and (4) are ises. But all four statements are really the same.
Coase used the term "affectation" for posing as "positive" and not "normative."
Let's see if I can help. (1) is clearly normative. (2) is normative unless stated in the context of a philosophy class where the "I think..." portion is under empirical dispute. (3) is positive in that it is an empirical statement to be backed up or argued against with data. (4) is a really stupid positive statement (though I suppose it's possible to poll "wise people," provided there is consensus on who the "wise people" are) and is really a normative claim (1) and (2), wrapped up in positive clothing.
None of these statements are support for the normative claim that The wise man expunges "positive v. normative" from his vocabulary or the positive claim that Ises and oughts are easily and naturally translated into one another, based on the purposes of the interlocutors and the discourse situation--unless he means in the most trivial sense. Obviously there is a formalistic sense in which (2) is not the same as (1), but it's splitting hairs. This isn't even a vauge-predicate case; it's a "don't be a trivial twit about normative/positive case."
It would be less annoying if it weren't another economist justifying the fact that in public policy debates we're supposed to take the conditional and positive statements of economists as normative gospel.
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